Joiner Flourishing Pathway Blog Sixteen - Family
Updated: Sep 9
How can an ethic of social, emotional, and moral wellbeing help families navigate the competing demands of individual autonomy, parental wellbeing, and children’s developmental needs, while recognising that the flourishing of each family member is deeply interconnected with that of the others?
Outcome - JFP Principle 16
An ethic of social, emotional and moral wellbeing provides a framework for moving beyond an either/or choice between the wellbeing of parents and that of children. Instead, it asks how family life, social structures, and systems of care can be organised to support the social, emotional, and moral wellbeing of all family members, while giving particular consideration to the vulnerability and developmental needs of infants and young children.
In the previous posts, I introduced a theory called the ethics of social, emotional, and moral wellbeing. Here, I explore how this framework can help us reimagine family life, beginning with its reconsideration of autonomy.

Traditional liberal conceptions of autonomy centre on independence, self-sufficiency, and contractual justice. Long critiqued by feminist care theorists, they posit that such concepts fail to recognise that human beings are totally dependent on others for their survival, not only for their early growth and development and end of life, but also for the myriad of others who supply them with community, goods, services, and relationships throughout their lives.
Psychological research backs this view. Data shows that when a person’s main desire is aspiring to ideals of individualism and self-sufficiency, they have higher levels of loneliness, disconnection, and despair (Kasser 2002). Psychologists theorise that when people place their time and emphasis on individualism and economic achievement, they necessarily spend less time valuing and cultivating meaningful relationships that we now know are fundamentally important to our wellbeing. As a consequence, such persons have lower levels of wellbeing.
Yet, while psychology can show the Western version of autonomy is impoverished, it remains dominant, making room for capitalist values such as individualism, wealth accumulation, and self-centredness to be perpetuated as things to be prised.
Gilligan’s (2014) research based on interviews with men after their war service, lead her to conclude that when people embody autonomy’s so called ideals, it does not represent individual progress but actually signifies moral injury (p. 89).
In recognition of a need to redefine autonomy, and to indicate that our choices and identities are shaped within networks of personal relationships feminist philosophers Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000) coined the term relational autonomy (p. 3).
However, feeling that this was still limiting autonomy to those with whom we are personally engaged, I have taken this idea further, coining the term social autonomy. This is to indicate that autonomy ought to encompass not only our personal relationships, but our impersonal relationships, including: goods makers, service providers, those whom we depend on economically, politically, and psychologically, as well as all that goes with positive relational qualities, such as empathy, respect, and care, that enhance our interactions with them.
An ethic of social, emotional, and moral wellbeing has this version of autonomy central to it. This ethic views the infant, surrounded by its family, community, and society as the building block of society. The healthier the environment the infant is raised, the healthier future society will be. For families this concept is critical. As Blustein (1982) writes, “The family is not merely a collection of separate individuals, but a community in which the satisfaction of one kind of interest entails the satisfaction of the other.” Our wellbeing is completely interconnected with others, and the family is just the beginning.
Given Western families now generally have only one or two children (ABS 2024), the opportunity to nurture a baby in an unrushed, deeply loving and attentive way occupies only a fleeting period within an adult’s lifetime. Rather than automatically representing paternalism, feminist philosopher Sara Ruddick (1989) argues, nurturing children can itself be a legitimate and fulfilling expression of agency, describing this as maternal work (p.18).
But any theory that supports family life must also confront the reality of finances. Increasing financial pressure makes caregiving difficult for many families, even when parents recognise its importance to children's healthy development. One possible response (and there are many) is the implementation of a Universal Basic Income (UBI), through which every person receives a basic income that can either support them directly or supplement paid employment. As inequality and insecure work increase, UBI has attracted growing international attention (Bidadanure 2019). Petra Bueskens (2017) argues that it is particularly significant option for mothers, who often bear disproportionate economic costs from caregiving. A guaranteed income could enable parents to prioritise caregiving without sacrificing dignity, autonomy, or financial security.
However, policy reform alone is not enough. We must also be aware of the cultural expectations that have developed alongside the rise of dual-income households. In 1950s Australia, many families were supported by a single income. Women rightly challenged the restrictions of being defined solely as homemakers and sought careers and lives beyond the home. Yet the subsequent shift towards two incomes has also coincided with rising expectations. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2005), Australian homes have increased in size by around 40% since the 1950’s and is frequently ranked as having the largest average house size internationally, contributing to financial pressures that make two incomes increasingly necessary.
At the same time, childcare has become more readily available, while social expectations encourage women to return to paid employment at increasingly young ages of their children. This has normalised placing infants into childcare earlier, with comparatively little public discussion about the implications for infant development.
Maternity leave is at least one supportive mechanism that is currently available. While I strongly advocate for its extension, at least it provides some recognition that mothers need time to recover from pregnancy, establish relationships with their newborns, and breastfeed where possible. Yet the needs of infants extend beyond the maternity period. Brain development during the first two years of life is unprecedented. During this time foundational brain patterning is embedded, as we’ve previously discussed in earlier blogs. The importance of having the conditions which support the development of secure attachment which underpin long-term wellbeing cannot be overstated.
Thus, we ought to develop a new cultural appreciation for nurturing. As explored in this and JFP Blog 15, caregiving should not be understood as a barrier to women's autonomy, but as a valid and profound expression of it. Autonomy is not diminished by caregiving; it can be strengthened through the loving, consistent relationships that foster belonging, resilience, and growth.
Therefore, we must reconsider what constitutes a meaningful life and how society can better support families to flourish. To develop a new approach society needs to adopt a new ethic – one that places infants and their families at the centre, and resource families appropriately to honour this philosophy.
Ultimately, an ethic of social, emotional, and moral wellbeing asks us to redefine our priorities; moving away from a primary focus on money and individualism towards relationships, care, and connection. Autonomy is not about going it alone. It is about understanding ourselves as interdependent beings.
Bibliography
ABS, A. G. (2024). Births, Australia. A. B. o. Statistics. Australia.
Bidadanure, J. U. (2019). "The political theory of universal basic income." Annual Review of Political Science 22(1): 481–501.
Blustein, J. (1982). Parents and children: The ethics of the family. New York, Oxford University Press.
Bueskens, P. (2017). "Mothers and Basic Income: The Case for an Urgent Intervention." New Matilda 23.
Gilligan, C. (2014). "Moral injury and the ethic of care: Reframing the conversation about differences." Journal of social philosophy 45(1): 89.
Government, A. (2005). Australian Home Size is Growing. A. B. o. Statistics. Australia, Australian Government.
Joiner, G. (2022). The Foundations of Flourishing and Our Responsibility to Infants: An ethical and evidence-based case to challenge the societal acceptance of childcare. UK, Ethics International Press
Kasser, T. (2002). The high price of materialism. Cambridge, MIT press.
Mackenzie, C. and N. Stoljar (2000). Introduction: Autonomy Refigured. New York: Oxford UP. C. Mackenzie and N. Stoljar. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 3–31.
Ruddick, S. (1989). Maternal thinking: toward a politics of peace. London, Women's Press.



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